Michael Saylor argues BIP-110 lacks real miner backing as it fails to hit its voluntary lock-in target, even while Bitcoin moves toward a mandatory signaling phase that could enforce the proposal regardless of support.
By early August, signaling for Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 110 had stalled at around 2.5% of blocks – far below the 55% voluntary threshold set for this difficulty period. Based on chain data and an August 1 analysis by MicroStrategy Executive Chairman Michael Saylor, the proposal is now mathematically incapable of reaching voluntary lock-in during the current 2,016-block window.
At block 960,561, Saylor reported that BIP-110 had received 24 signaling blocks out of 946, or 2.54%. His review indicated that every single one of those signaling blocks originated from miners using DATUM while sharing rewards through the OCEAN pool. He said that, at that point, there were zero signals originating from outside that OCEAN/DATUM setup, suggesting a very narrow base of active support.
By 11:13 UTC on August 2, a public BIP-110 monitoring tool had advanced to block 960,723. At that height, 28 blocks out of 1,108 signaled for BIP-110, equivalent to 2.53% – essentially unchanged. With only 908 blocks left in the period, even a perfect run of signals could not reach the 1,109 signaling blocks (55% of 2,016) required for voluntary activation. The maximum possible total would be 936, far short of the threshold, confirming Saylor’s “mathematically unreachable” assessment.
On that basis, Saylor concluded that BIP-110 does not have miner consensus. The monitor’s data broadly supports his arithmetic and the low overall signaling level, though it does not independently verify his specific attribution that all earlier signals were tied to DATUM miners coordinating reward splits via OCEAN. His pool analysis applied to the 24 signaling blocks he examined at block 960,561; subsequent signals did not meaningfully change the overall signaling rate.
BIP-110, formally titled the Reduced Data Temporary Softfork, proposes a one-year package of consensus changes that would temporarily restrict certain types of transaction data on the Bitcoin network. The proposal introduces seven specific limitations, including:
– Constraining most new output scripts to a maximum size of 34 bytes.
– Capping OP_RETURN outputs at 83 bytes.
– Restricting certain data pushes in scripts to 256 bytes.
– Temporarily limiting aspects of Taproot-related functionality.
Outputs that exist before activation would be grandfathered in and exempt from the new rules, so the constraints would mainly affect newly created transactions for the duration of the soft fork.
Supporters argue that these temporary limitations would significantly curb arbitrary data insertion into the blockchain, discouraging non-monetary uses such as bulk data storage or certain inscription-like activity. Their stated goal is to keep Bitcoin’s block space primarily focused on financial transactions and to reduce long-term chain bloat from non-essential data. They frame the change as a narrow, time-limited cleanup measure rather than a permanent redesign of Bitcoin’s capabilities.
Opponents, including Saylor and Blockstream co-founder Adam Back, counter that consensus rules should not be used to decide which legally valid and technically permissible transaction patterns are “worthy” of block space. In their view, once a transaction structure is valid under the existing protocol, it should be up to miners, users, and markets-not protocol-level bans-to determine whether it gets included. Saylor has previously argued that fee markets and individual node policies provide safer, more flexible tools for dealing with controversial or unwanted data uses without hardcoding preferences into consensus.
Saylor also criticized how signaling for BIP-110 appears to have been implemented in some environments. He claimed that OCEAN made signaling for the proposal the default on an existing endpoint, effectively turning support for BIP-110 into an opt-out rather than an opt-in choice. He characterized the broader effort as a “vertically integrated marketing campaign for Knots and OCEAN/DATUM,” suggesting that the initiative combines software distribution, infrastructure, and mining coordination around a single policy objective. That description reflects his interpretation and is not a conclusion reached by an independent standards or review body.
There is, however, a documented technical relationship among the components he mentions. The official BIP-110 installation instructions direct users toward the Bitcoin Knots implementation and provide guidance for pointing rented hashpower at a DATUM node. OCEAN’s DATUM documentation explains that miners construct block templates locally using their own nodes, while OCEAN coordinates the distribution of block rewards rather than building the block work itself. These materials confirm how the pieces fit together technically, yet they do not by themselves prove Saylor’s allegation that the arrangement is primarily a promotional or marketing vehicle.
The timeline for BIP-110’s deployment is already in motion. The voluntary signaling phase for the current difficulty period ends at block 961,631. From block 961,632 through 963,647, any node running software that enforces BIP-110 is programmed to reject blocks that do not set bit 4 in the version field, effectively requiring 100% signaling from the perspective of enforcing nodes. If this behavior proceeds as designed, the proposal would be deemed “locked in” at block 963,648 and then fully activated at block 965,664, after which its transaction data restrictions would apply for 52,416 blocks.
Saylor warned that a perfect 100% signaling rate during this mandatory window would not represent a genuine surge in support but merely reflect the enforced rule among nodes running the new software. In other words, the appearance of unanimity would be a byproduct of enforcement logic rather than a renewed vote of confidence by miners. This distinction becomes critical when evaluating whether a soft fork has real consensus versus simply being obeyed by a subset of the network enforcing new rules.
Foundry USA, one of the major Bitcoin mining pools, has asked its clients to explicitly vote on whether the pool should signal for BIP-110. Its voting period was scheduled to wrap up near the start of the mandatory phase at block 961,632. As of August 2, no verified, broadly disclosed outcome of that internal vote was available, leaving Foundry’s ultimate stance uncertain in public data.
The next decisive signals about BIP-110’s legitimacy will come from how large mining pools, exchanges, wallet providers, and node operators respond before and during the mandatory signaling phase. The low voluntary signaling rate alone does not automatically halt the deployment because the BIP explicitly includes a period of forced signaling as part of its activation logic. However, a deep mismatch between node-enforcing rules and the behavior of the majority of hashpower would leave the network exposed to a split.
If most hashpower continues to mine blocks that do not signal bit 4 while a material set of nodes is rejecting such blocks, enforcing nodes could follow a minority chain, diverging from the longest-chain consensus of non-enforcing nodes and miners. Both Saylor and Adam Back have underscored this risk, cautioning that pushing ahead with BIP-110 without broad, multi-stakeholder alignment could fracture the network, echoing historical tensions seen during previous block size and soft fork controversies.
The controversy around BIP-110 also highlights the broader question of how Bitcoin should evolve when it comes to non-monetary use cases, such as inscriptions, NFTs, or arbitrary data embedding. One camp sees protocol-level restrictions like those in BIP-110 as necessary to preserve Bitcoin’s monetary focus, keep node costs manageable, and prevent what they view as abuse of block space. The other camp sees such moves as creeping central planning: a small group defining “legitimate” versus “illegitimate” transactions and encoding that value judgment into consensus rules.
Fee-based approaches present a competing philosophy. Under this model, if certain data-heavy transactions are economically inefficient, they will eventually be priced out by the market as users compete for limited block space. Node operators could further choose to filter or deprioritize unwanted transaction types at the policy level without rendering them universally invalid. This approach keeps core consensus more neutral while still giving participants tools to respond to perceived spam or abuse.
The role of mining pools and infrastructure providers is also under fresh scrutiny. When a pool or software stack enables or defaults to signaling for a proposal, it raises governance questions: Are individual miners fully informed and consenting, or are they passively swept into a policy change because of default settings or bundled configurations? Saylor’s criticism of OCEAN and DATUM taps into a long-running debate over how much influence intermediaries should have in signaling consensus changes on behalf of underlying hashpower.
For node operators and businesses building on Bitcoin, the BIP-110 episode functions as a live stress test of the ecosystem’s coordination mechanisms. It forces a practical examination of how activation thresholds, voluntary versus mandatory signaling, and economic incentives interact. If the mandatory phase proceeds with weak voluntary backing, the outcome will reveal whether network participants are willing to upgrade and align with the new rules or whether they resist, potentially leading to stalled enforcement or chain-level divergence.
Longer term, the way BIP-110 is handled may shape how future soft forks are designed and communicated. Developers could become more cautious about embedding mandatory windows if the market reacts negatively, or they may refine activation parameters to better reflect true consensus. Conversely, if the network smoothly absorbs BIP-110 despite its low voluntary support, advocates of more assertive changes might feel encouraged to use similar mechanisms again.
For now, the data is clear on one point: BIP-110 did not win voluntary miner consensus in the current difficulty period, with signaling stuck around 2.5% instead of the required 55%. Whether that lack of early support ultimately halts, reshapes, or merely shadows the proposal’s activation will depend on how miners, node operators, and major ecosystem players respond as Bitcoin approaches its mandatory signaling window.