FTX and Alameda Lieutenants Face Up to Decade-Long Ban From Wall Street
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has moved to sideline three of Sam Bankman-Fried’s closest former deputies from the traditional finance world for as long as ten years, under proposed settlement deals tied to their roles in the collapse of FTX and Alameda Research.
On Friday, the regulator said it had submitted proposed final consent judgments to a federal court in the Southern District of New York for Caroline Ellison, the former CEO of Alameda Research; Gary Wang, the former chief technology officer of FTX; and Nishad Singh, the former head of engineering at the exchange. All three were central figures in the criminal prosecution of FTX co-founder and ex-CEO Sam Bankman-Fried, providing testimony that helped secure his conviction.
Under the proposed settlements, Ellison, Wang, and Singh have agreed to sweeping restrictions on their future careers in corporate America. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, they consented to:
– Permanent bans on violating federal securities laws going forward
– Conduct-based injunctions temporarily limiting the kinds of activities they can perform in financial markets
– Long-term prohibitions on serving as officers or directors of publicly traded companies, effectively blocking them from senior roles at most Wall Street firms for up to a decade
While the exact lengths and conditions of each bar may differ between the three executives, the impact is similar: they will be largely shut out from leadership positions in regulated financial institutions and listed companies for years. That means no C-suite roles, no board seats, and no positions that give them authority over investor money in the traditional securities ecosystem.
Ellison, who led FTX’s affiliated trading firm Alameda Research, admitted in her criminal case that customer deposits from FTX were misused to plug trading losses and fund risky bets. Wang, as FTX’s co-founder and CTO, helped design and maintain the exchange’s trading engine and back-end systems, while Singh oversaw core engineering functions and code changes that prosecutors said enabled the misuse of customer funds. Their insider knowledge made them crucial witnesses against Bankman-Fried.
The SEC’s civil actions run in parallel to the criminal proceedings brought by federal prosecutors. While the criminal cases focused on fraud and conspiracy charges that could send defendants to prison, the SEC’s remit is to police securities markets, impose financial penalties, and determine who is fit to participate in the regulated financial system. Officer-and-director bars are one of the toughest tools in the Commission’s arsenal, typically reserved for people it views as serious risks to investors.
In consenting to these judgments, the three former executives are effectively accepting a long-term exile from mainstream finance while avoiding a full-blown civil trial with the SEC. Agreeing “without admitting or denying” the allegations is standard language in many SEC settlements and allows the cases to be resolved without formal findings of fact by a judge, while still imposing meaningful punishment and deterrence.
For Wall Street, the settlement sends a clear signal: senior leaders of crypto firms that tap into U.S. capital markets can be held to the same standards as executives of banks, brokers, and listed corporations. The message is that the “move fast and break things” culture often associated with crypto cannot serve as a shield against traditional securities law enforcement when customer assets and investor protection are at stake.
For the three former FTX lieutenants, the practical consequences are severe. In addition to their cooperation in the criminal trials and any prison sentences that may arise from those cases, they now face years during which they will be unable to hold top roles at public companies, major broker-dealers, or registered investment advisers. Even after the bars expire, their reputations inside regulated finance are likely to remain tarnished, making a return to high-profile Wall Street positions difficult at best.
The bans also illustrate how regulators are trying to build guardrails around the intersection of crypto and traditional finance. FTX operated in a gray area: a crypto exchange serving millions of users while courting institutional investors and promoting itself as a bridge between digital assets and mainstream markets. When it collapsed, the fallout did not just rock the crypto industry; it triggered broader concerns about governance, risk controls, and disclosure in high-growth, tech-driven financial platforms.
From a compliance perspective, these settlements will likely be studied inside banks, exchanges, and fintech startups as a case study in what can happen when internal controls fail and executives blur the line between customer assets and proprietary funds. Risk and legal teams will see in Ellison, Wang, and Singh a reminder that technical or back-office roles are no shield from personal liability when those roles enable misconduct.
For crypto firms hoping to work more closely with Wall Street, the outcome underscores an uncomfortable reality: once a business touches U.S. investors or U.S. markets, it is playing under the SEC’s rules, whether it labels itself as a crypto exchange, a trading protocol, or a technology company. Any perceived attempt to evade those rules—or to treat them as optional—risks not only enforcement actions against the company but personal career-ending sanctions for the individuals in charge.
Investors, meanwhile, may take some reassurance from the aggressive stance. Officer and director bans are designed to protect markets by keeping individuals associated with serious misconduct away from positions where they can again control investor money or shape corporate disclosures. While such penalties do not compensate victims directly, they form part of a broader accountability framework alongside criminal restitution, bankruptcy recoveries, and private litigation.
The FTX saga is still far from over. Bankruptcy proceedings continue, with administrators attempting to recover and redistribute assets to creditors and former customers. Civil suits against a wide range of parties—from promoters to advisors—are also ongoing. But the SEC’s proposed settlements with Ellison, Wang, and Singh mark an important chapter in the regulatory response: a clear attempt to ensure that the inner circle that helped build and run one of the most notorious failed crypto empires cannot quickly reappear in the command centers of traditional finance.
Looking forward, the case is likely to influence how future crypto leaders structure their businesses, manage conflicts of interest, and interact with regulators. Corporate governance, real risk management, independent boards, and transparent segregation of customer funds are no longer optional features for ambitious crypto firms seeking legitimacy; they are becoming preconditions for any meaningful integration with Wall Street and public markets.
In that sense, the decade-long shadow now hanging over Ellison, Wang, and Singh extends much further than their own careers. It is a warning shot to the entire industry: innovation may be welcome, but when it intersects with investor capital, it must operate inside the same legal boundaries that govern the rest of the financial system.